巴菲特眼中的商业：How to Think About Businesses（中）

编者按：本文来自微信公众号“港股那点事”（ID:hkstocks），36氪经授权发布。

What types of businesses have the highest ROIC?

什么样的企业ROIC最高？

WB: You could run Coca-Cola with no capital. There are a number of businesses that operate on negative capital. Great magazines operate with negative capital. Subscriptions are paid upfront, they have limited fixed investments. There are certain businesses like this. Blue Chip Stamps - it got float ahead of time. There are a lot of great businesses. Apple doesn’t need very much capital. See’s needs little capital but it can’t get that large -- we can’t get people eating 10 lbs of boxed chocolate every day. Great consumer businesses need relatively little capital. Where people pay you in advance (magazines, insurance), you are using your customers’ capital. But the rest of the world knows this and they get expensive. It can be competitive to buy them. Business Wire – it doesn’t require capital. Many service businesses require little capital. When successful, they can be something.

巴菲特：可口可乐不需要资本也可以运作。但是有很多企业都在加杠杆运作。伟大的杂志社也是负债运作的。订阅费是预先支付的，杂志社的固定投资又很少。一些特定的行业就像这样。Blue Chip Stamps公司——提前上市了。还有很多伟大的公司都是的。苹果也不需要大量的现金。喜事糖果也不需要那么多现金，毕竟它也发展不成那么大的规模，我们不可能要求大家每天都吃10磅的巧克力吧。很多伟大的消费品行业需要的现金相对来说较少。比如那些客户预先支付的行业（杂志社、保险公司），用的其实是客户的资本。但是大家都知道这个，所以这些企业很贵。要买到这些公司的股票也不是那么简单的事情。Business Wire这家公司也不需要什么现金。一旦成功了，这样的企业也会很了不起。

CM: Nothing to add, the formula never changes.

芒格：我没什么要添加的，还是一样的准则。

WB: If you could own one business in the world, what would it be?

巴菲特：如果你能拥有这世界上一家企业，你想要哪一家？

CM: You and I got in trouble many decades ago for this, naming the most fabulous business. High pricing power, a monopoly – we don’t want to name it publicly!

芒格：我们俩几十年前就为这个问题招惹了麻烦，要说出最好的企业是哪一家。高的定价权、有垄断性——最好还是别在公众场合说出它的名字！

What businesses should we avoid?

我们要避免什么样的企业？

In the textile industry, we always had new machinery that held the promise of increasing our profit, but it never did because everyone else bought the same machinery. It was sort of like being in a crowd, and everyone stands on tip-toes – your view doesn’t improve, but your legs hurt.

在纺织行业里，经常有新的机器出来，承诺提高我们的收益，但这其实并不能提高我们的收益因为别人也都买了那些新机器。就好像在人群中每个人都垫脚，你垫了脚视野并不会更好，但是你的脚肯定会痛。

What have been your business mistakes?

你经营公司时犯过什么错误？

How much time do you have? The interesting thing about investments for me and my partner, Charlie Munger, the biggest mistakes have not been mistakes of commission, but of omission. They are where we knew enough about the business to do something and where, for one reason or another, sat they're sucking out thumbs instead of doing something. And so we have passed up things where we could have made billions and billions of dollars from things we understood, forget about things we don’t understand. The fact I could have made billions of dollars from Microsoft doesn’t mean anything because I never could understand Microsoft. But if I can make billions out of healthcare stocks, then I should make it. And I didn’t when the Clinton health care program was proposed and they all went in the tank. We should have made a ton of money out of that because I could understand it. And didn’t make it.

我犯的错数不清，你有多少时间听？对我和我的合伙人查理芒格来说，投资很有意思的一点就是最大的错误往往不是重大失误造成的，而是遗漏造成的。往往就是在我们对一个企业有足够多的了解，知道自己要做什么事情时，但是由于各种各样的原因，我们就是吸吸大拇指什么也不做。所以单从我们懂的行业里，我们就错过了赚上成百上千亿美金的机会，更别说那些不懂的了。我从微软身上赚了数十亿美金并不能说明什么，因为我没从来都没了解过微软。但是如果我能从医疗股票里赚上数十亿，我就应该去赚。克林顿医疗法案出来的时候我没做什么，最后这些股票都涨了很多。我们应该抓住这个机会大赚一笔的，因为这是我看得懂的行业，但是我们并没做到。

I should have made a ton of money out of Fannie Mae back the mid-1980s, but I didn’t do it. Those are billion dollar mistakes or multi-billion dollar mistakes that generally accepted accounting principles don’t pick up. The mistakes you see. I made a mistake when I bought US Air Preferred some years ago. I had a lot of money around. I make mistakes when I get cash. Charlie tells me to go to a bar instead. Don’t hang around the office. But I hang around the office and I have money in my pocket, I do something dumb. It happens every time. So I bought this thing. Nobody made me buy it. I now have an 800 number I call every time I think about buying a stock in an airline. I say, “I am Warren and I am an air-aholic.” They try to talk me down, “Keep talking don’t do anything rash.” Finally I got over it. But I bought it. And it looked like we would lose all our money in it. And we came very close to losing all our money in it. You can say we deserved to lose our money it.

二十世纪八十年代时，我应该从房利美身上赚回来一大笔钱，但是我并没有。这些是我犯下的损失了十亿、数十亿美金的错误，这些都是单纯地依靠财务报表做出的决定。还有一些你知道的错误。几年前我埋下US Air Preferred时也犯下过一个错误。当时我手里有很多现金，手上的现金一多我就容易犯错。查理叫我直接去监狱得了，不要整天在办公司晃悠。但是我并没有去监狱，我在办公室瞎晃悠，口袋里还有大笔现金，于是我做了一些啥事情。这个事情发生过不止一次了。所以我买了US Air Preferred. 没人叫我买。现在只要我每次想到买航空公司的股票，都会拨800。我会说“我是沃伦·巴菲特，我酗酒。”他们就试着劝我，“跟我们说话，别做冲动的事情”。然后我就会没事儿了。但是我还是买了。我本来以为我们会在在这只股票上砸掉所有的钱。事实上我们差点破产了。即便我们赔光了所有的钱，这也是我们该受的。

We bought it because it was an attractive security. But it was not in an attractive industry. I did the same thing in Salomon. I bought an attractive security in a business I wouldn’t have bought the equity in. So you could say that is one form of mistake. Buying something because you like the terms, but you don’t like the business that well. I have done that in the past and will probably do that again. The bigger mistakes are the ones of omission. Back when I had $10,000 I put $2,000 of it into a Sinclair Service Station which I lost, so the opportunity cost on that money is about $6 billion right now--fairly big mistakes. It makes me feel good when my Berkshire goes down, because the cost of my Sinclair Station goes down too. My 20% opportunity cost. I will say this, it is better to learn from other people’s mistakes as much as possible. But we don’t spend any time looking back at Berkshire. I have a partner, Charlie Munger; we have been pals for forty years—never had an argument. We disagree on things a lot but we don’t have arguments about it.

我们买它是因为它是个十分有吸引力的股票。只不过它所在的行业就没那么有吸引力了。我采用了同样的方法对待Salomon这支股票。我买了一个我本不该买的行业里那支有吸引力的股票。这是我常犯的一种错误模式。因为一家公司买入股票，但是并不看好公司所处的整个行业。我以前就犯过这样的错误，以后可能还会犯。更大的错误就是遗漏问题。回到之前我手头有1万美金的时候，我投了2000美金到Sinclair Service Station这支股票上，然后赔掉了。所以这个错误的机会成本在现在看来差不多是60亿美金，着实是个大错误。所以现在看到伯克希尔股价跌了我是开心的，因为这意味着Sinclair Service Station的机会成本也在减小。花了我1/5仓位的机会成本啊。但是我们并没有再花时间过多关注伯克希尔。我有个合伙人，查理芒格；我们是40年的老朋友了-我们从来没有发生过争执。我们在很多事情上的看法都不尽相同，但是在这件事情上我们毫无争执。

We never look back. We just figure there is so much to look forward to that there is no sense thinking of what we might have done. It just doesn’t make any difference. You can only live life forward. You can learn something perhaps from the mistakes, but the big thing to do is to stick with the businesses you understand. So if there is a generic mistake outside your circle of competence like buying something that somebody tips you on or something of the sort. In an area you know nothing about, you should learn something from that which is to stay with what you can figure out yourself. You really want your decision making to be by looking in the mirror. Saying to yourself, “I am buying 100 shares of General Motors at $55 because........” It is your responsibility if you are buying it. There’s gotta be a reason and if you can’t state the reason, you shouldn’t buy it. If it is because someone told you about it at a cocktail party, not good enough. It can’t be because of the volume or a reason like the chart looks good. It has to be a reason to buy the business. That we stick to pretty carefully. That is one of the things Ben Graham taught me.

我们绝不追忆过去。我们觉得未来还有很多事情要做，而去思考我们过去做的事情没什么意义。回忆也不能改变什么。你只能向前看。或许你可以从犯下的错误中学会点道理，但是最重要的还是一头扎进你了解的那个行业里去。如果你在自己的能力圈之外犯下了很笼统的错误，比如根据别人的消息买入股票、或者类此的事情。在你不懂的领域，你应该从中学到的是有哪些公司是你能自己研究弄明白的。你真正希望做出的决定是你看着镜子里的自己，对自己说：“我要以55美金的价格买入100股的General Motors ，因为……”。 这是你自己需要承担的责任。 买入肯定是有原因的，如果你说不出来原因，你就不应该买它。如果是因为在某个鸡尾酒晚会认识的人告诉你要买它，这还不足以让你买入。也不可能是因为公司体量，或者是图表好看。我们要一直小心地坚定这个买入的原因。这是本·格雷厄姆教会我的一个道理。

If we start buying a stock, we want to go in heavy. I can't think of a stock where we wanted to quit.

一旦我们想买一只股票，我们就想重仓。我想不出来有哪支股票是我们想卖掉的。

We've made some big mistakes starting to buy something that was cheap and within our circle of competence, but trickled off because price went up a bit. Good ideas are too scarce to be parsimonious with.

我们还犯过一些错误，就是在我们的能力圈之内买入一些很便宜的股票，但是股价稍微上涨了一点就卖掉了。好的想法太少了，不能吝啬。

CM: After nearly making a terrible mistake not buying See's, we've made this mistake many times. We are apparently slow learners. These opportunity costs don't show up on financial statements, but have cost us many billions.

芒格: 在几乎犯下错过喜事糖果的问题之后，我们还多次犯下过这个错误。很显然，我们学得很慢。这些机会成本没有在财务报表中显现出来，但是却着实让我们损耗了数几十亿。

The main mistakes we’ve made – some of them big time – are: 1) Ones when we didn’t invest at all, even when we understood it was cheap; and 2) Starting in on an investment and not maximizing it.

这些主要的我们犯过的错误—其中一些是非常重要的，是：1.当一个公司很便宜，同时我们可以理解，但是我们没有买他。2.在开始进入一些投资时，我们没有把它利润最大化。

Charlie is a big fan of doing things on a big scale. But when I bought something at X and it went up to X and 1/8th, I sometimes stopped buying, perhaps hoping it would come back down. We’ve missed billions when I’ve gotten anchored.

查理很热忱于从长远的角度做事情。如果我因在某个价格买入一支股票，然后这个股票上涨了1/8，我会停止买入，我期待着它或许能跌回来一些。在我犹豫不决的时候，我又错过了数几十亿。

CM: Do you have anything worse to confess than Wal-Mart?

查理芒格：你有什么比沃尔玛更糟糕的事情要忏悔么？

I cost us about $10 billion. I set out to buy 100 million sharers, pre-split, at $23. We bought a little and it moved up a bit and I stopped buying. Perhaps I thought it might come back a bit – who knows? That thumb-sucking, the reluctance to pay a little more, cost us a lot. There are other examples.

我损失了100亿美金。在拆股前，我以23块的价格买了1亿股。只要我们买一点，它就往上涨一点，然后我就不买了。或许我觉得股价会降下来一点，但是谁知道呢？吸吸大拇指的懒惰行为、不愿意再多花点钱让我们赔掉了更多的钱。还有其它更多的例子。

On the other hand, it doesn’t bother us. If every shot you hit in golf was a hole-in-one, you’d lose interest. You gotta hit a few in the woods.

在另一方便，这个问题确实让我们很苦恼。就像打高尔夫球的时候，如果你百发百中，你不久就会失去兴趣。肯定有几次是打到杆子上的。

We probably won’t make the kind of mistake that costs us a lot – though we did with Dexter Shoes. We’re more likely to make mistakes of omission, not commission, in the future.

或许我们不会犯下损失大量钱的错误——但是我们确实在Dexter Shoes上犯了。未来也是，我们肯定还是会因为遗漏犯下错误，而不是因为失误。

CM: Since mistakes of omission don’t appear in the financial statements, most people don’t pay attention to them. We rub our noses in mistakes of omission – as we just did.

由于这类的疏失不会在财务报表上显现出来，所以多数人都注意不到，而我们在犯下这类错误时，大多也只能摸摸鼻子了事。

How do you determine what is the proper price to pay for the business?

你是如何判断什么价格是你愿意为一个企业而支付的？

It is a tough thing to decide but I don’t want to buy into any business I am not terribly sure of. So if I am terribly sure of it, it probably won’t offer incredible returns. Why should something that is essentially a cinch to do well, offer you 40% a year? We don’t have huge returns in mind, but we do have in mind not losing anything. We bought See’s Candy in 1972, See’s Candy was then selling 16 m. pounds of candy at a $1.95 a pound and it was making 2 bits a pound or $4 million pre-tax. We paid $25 million for it—6.25 x pretax or about 10x after tax. It took no capital to speak of. When we looked at that business—basically, my partner, Charlie, and I—we needed to decide if there was some untapped pricing power there. Where that $1.95 box of candy could sell for $2 to $2.25. If it could sell for $2.25 or another $0.30 per pound that was $4.8 on 16 million pounds. Which on a $25 million purchase price was fine. We never hired a consultant in our lives。

这个是一个很难的事情，但是我不想买入任何我不是特别确定的企业。如果我非常确定，这个投资可能不能带来非常高的收益。为什么一个一定不会出问题的投资可能给你提供你每年40%的投资回报呢？在我们的思维里，赚更多钱不是最重要的，我们时刻谨记不要赔钱。我们在1972年买入了喜诗糖果，当时喜诗糖果一年的销售量是1600万磅的。每磅喜诗糖果的售价是1.95美金，当年喜诗糖果的EBT（税前利润）是400万美金。我们花了2500万美金来买下来这个公司，大概是税前利润的6.25倍，税后利润的10倍。当我们看这个生意时，查理芒格和我在研究喜诗糖果是否有未利用的提价权。是否1.95美金的售价可以提高到2美金或者2.25美金。如果它能以2.25美金每磅的价格销售1600万磅糖果，那么这项2500万美金的投资仅仅只是税前利润的5倍。我们在我们的一生中从来没有雇佣过一个投资咨询师。

What we did know was that they had share of mind in California. There was something special. Every person in Ca. has something in mind about See’s Candy and overwhelmingly it was favorable. They had taken a box on Valentine’s Day to some girl and she had kissed him. If she slapped him, we would have no business. As long as she kisses him, that is what we want in their minds. See’s Candy means getting kissed. If we can get that in the minds of people, we can raise prices. I bought it in 1972, and every year I have raised prices on Dec. 26th, the day after Christmas, because we sell a lot on Christmas. In fact, we will make $60 million this year. We will make $2 per pound on 30 million pounds. Same business, same formulas, same everything--$60 million bucks and it still doesn’t take any capital.

我们知道的是，喜诗糖果在加州人心中有绝对的地位。喜诗糖果很特别。每一个加州人都喜欢喜诗糖果。在情人节那天，如果男生送给女生喜诗糖果，女生会亲吻他。如果送给女生会给男生一巴掌，那么我们也就没生意可做了。只要女生依旧亲男生，喜事糖果对男生来讲意味着得到香吻一枚。如果我们能让这个印象进入男生的脑海里，那么我们就能提价。我在1972年买入了喜事糖果，并且在12月26日的圣诞节后提高街售价。如今，我们每年以2没劲的售价销售300万磅的喜诗糖果。一样的生意，一样的配方，所有都一样，6000万美金的销售额，它依旧不需要任何额外的资本开支。

But of that $60 million, we make $55 million in the three weeks before Christmas. And our company song is: “What a friend we have in Jesus.” (Laughter). It is a good business. Think about it a little. Most people do not buy boxed chocolate to consume themselves, they buy them as gifts— somebody’s birthday or more likely it is a holiday. Valentine’s Day is the single biggest day of the year. Christmas is the biggest season by far. Women buy for Christmas and they plan ahead and buy over a two or three week period. Men buy on Valentine’s Day. They are driving home; we run ads on the Radio. Guilt, guilt, guilt—guys are veering off the highway right and left. They won’t dare go home without a box of Chocolates by the time we get through with them on our radio ads.

在那6000万美金的销售额中，有5500万美金都是在圣诞节前三周销售出去的。我们公司的歌曲是：我们是耶稣的好朋友。这是一个好生意。再多想一些。大多数人不会买巧克力来自己消费，他们把巧克力当做礼物—在一些人的生日或者节日中送出去。情人节是最重要的节日之一。圣诞节是最重要的节日。女人会在圣诞节前几周时间购物，来准备节日的到来。男生则在情人节那天购物。他们开出回家；我们在车上放广告。当我们在车上广播里反复放着广告时，男人们不敢回家不带一盒巧克力。

If you are See’s Candy, you want to do everything in the world to make sure that the experience basically of giving that gift leads to a favorable reaction. It means what is in the box, it means the person who sells it to you, because all of our business is done when we are terribly busy. People come in during theose weeks before Chirstmas, Valentine’s Day and there are long lines. So at five o’clock in the afternoon some woman is selling someone the last box candy and that person has been waiting in line for maybe 20 or 30 customers. And if the salesperson smiles at that last customer, our moat has widened and if she snarls at ‘em, our moat has narrowed. We can’t see it, but it is going on everyday. But it is the key to it. It is the total part of the product delivery. That is what business is all about.

如果你是喜诗糖果，你希望花一切努力来确保当给出喜诗糖果这个礼物会导致喜悦。这不仅仅意味着味道要很美味，也代表着销售喜诗糖果给你的那个人要很nice，因为我们的生意是在非常非常忙碌的节假日开始的。人们在圣诞节和情人节前几周来购买喜诗糖果，在这几周基本们上所有收银的地方都人满为患。如果我们的销售员对顾客微笑，那么我们的护城河就变得更深了，如果对他们大后大家，那么我们的护城河就变浅了。我们看不见这些事情，但是他没几天都发生，而且很重要。这就是整个产品产地过程。这就是喜诗糖果的全部。

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巴菲特眼中的商业：How to Think About Businesses（上）